

---

# Global Peace Partnership Treaty

This version is a draft. It is continuously being developed.

## Preamble

### Introduction

In a world full of tensions, war and growing insecurity, we need more than appeals. What is missing is a new treaty, not out of a claim to power, but out of responsibility. A treaty that does not threaten, but protects. One that unites rather than divides. And no longer negotiates whether peace is possible, but guarantees that peace remains.

The Global Peace Partnership (GPP) is an association of peace-loving states, which do not monitor each other, but protect each other. It protects its members through reliable solidarity, economic, humanitarian, technological and, in an emergency, also military. But without aggression, without expansion and above all: without circumventing international law.

### What this contract is for

Our world is closely interconnected, but it is precisely this interconnectedness that makes it vulnerable. Modern conflicts have an impact far beyond their borders. And yet too little is done. Because as long as no state can really be sure that others will stand by it in an emergency, deterrence remains the first option and peace a product of chance.

This is precisely where the GPP comes in:

It replaces geopolitical power calculations with treaty-based, verifiable solidarity. It does not protect through sanctions alone, but through the decision of others to protect themselves together.

**Those who are committed to peace partnership benefit from the protection of all, but lose it if they themselves become the aggressor.**

**International law is the inviolable foundation of the GPP. It will not be reinvented, but strengthened, made binding and flanked by concrete consequences.**

## Basic values of the GPP

The GPP is based on three non-negotiable principles:

1. reliable solidarity instead of wavering alliance loyalty
2. defended peace instead of tactical restraint
3. unconditional respect for international law, as the basis of all legitimacy

## Who this contract is open to

Any state that is committed to these principles and is prepared to actively protect peace, not only in its own country, but also for others, can become a member.

**Those who do not commit themselves are excluded. Not out of punishment, but because trust can only develop where common rules apply and lived responsibility begins.**

# Article 1: Respect for sovereignty and voluntary cooperation

## 1.1 Principle of mutual non-interference

The GPP member states undertake not to intervene in the internal political or institutional structures of other member states. Neither directly nor indirectly may the system of government, the territorial integrity or the social order of a member state be influenced or undermined from outside.

Where common interests exist, states can voluntarily harmonise their policies, systems or programmes. This harmonisation is based exclusively on mutual consent, never on coercion. Sovereignty remains inviolable.

# Article 2: Peacefulness and collective protection

## 2.1 Commitment to peacefulness

All member states of the GPP undertake to refrain from any form of aggression towards other members – regardless of whether it is of a military, technological, economic, political or other nature.

Aggression is deemed to exist in particular in the case of:

- Direct military attacks (e.g. invasion, air strikes, paramilitary operations)
- Violations of territorial integrity (e.g. by troops, drones, military infrastructure)
- Subversive influence (e.g. support for armed groups, insurgencies, destabilisation strategies)
- Economic aggression (e.g. trade blockades, boycotts of strategic goods, currency manipulation, targeted prevention of market access)
- Political aggression (e.g. disinformation campaigns, influencing elections, organised protest stimulation to destabilise)
- Cyber attacks (e.g. hacker attacks on critical infrastructure, data theft from government and business, digital sabotage)
- Science and technology theft (industrial espionage, such as illegal procurement of technologies or intellectual property; sabotage, such as undermining scientific or technological projects of another state)
- Environmental aggression (e.g. targeted pollution of border rivers, illegal deforestation, resource conflicts such as water, land or raw material disputes with the potential to escalate)
- Forced migration aggression (e.g. state-directed or deliberately tolerated migration flows as a means of exerting pressure to destabilise a neighbouring country)

Aggression also occurs when several of these measures are combined or repeatedly applied – regardless of whether they are carried out overtly, covertly or via third-party actors.

## 2.2 Protection in case of breach of contract

If a GPP state becomes an aggressor, the Community's protection mechanism comes into play:

exclusion from the protection system + coordinated protection measures by all others.

These include:

- Economic distancing (freezing assets, stopping payment transactions)
- Communication withdrawal (digital and physical separation of infrastructures)
- Traffic and logistics control (entry and exit strategies, transit and overflight pauses)
- Loss of voting rights and exclusion from GPP committees
- SEZs (timeout for companies from the aggressor state)
- Suspension of trade with the exception of humanitarian goods
- Reduction or suspension of diplomatic relations

These measures are considered

- not as punishment, but as collective protection against destabilisation
- Temporary: 5 years in addition to the duration of the ongoing aggression

## 2.3 Also valid for non-members

If a GPP member is attacked from outside (by a non-member state), the same collective defence obligation comes into force.

The strength of the GPP lies in its solidarity – not only in good times, but especially in emergencies.

Even if trade links threaten economic losses, the price of genuine solidarity is lower than the cost of an unprotected peace.

## 2.4 Supplementary contractual clause on solidarity-based crisis assistance

In the event of temporary supply bottlenecks caused by an attack or its economic, infrastructural or social consequences, the other member states of the GPP provide coordinated assistance.

### **Depending on requirements, this includes in particular:**

- energy
- medical care,
- food,
- as well as technological and logistical support.

### **Each member state provides up to 10% of its currently available resources in the affected areas for this purpose.**

The coordination of these aid measures is the responsibility of the GPP's central deployment structure (GPPs), which assesses the requirements, organises the provision and manages the distribution fairly.

The burden is distributed according to the gross domestic product (GDP) of the contributing countries, so that no state is overburdened and solidarity remains predictable.

### **The goods supplied are invoiced at solidarity prices:**

This means that the average procurement price of the sending country is applied – without profit mark-ups, export duties or artificial price increases. Depending on the situation, transport costs can be covered by the GPP in full or in part.

All decisions on collective defence measures – particularly in the event of external attacks or serious internal aggression – are taken by the GPP management committee in accordance with the decision-making model set out in Article 6.

The following applies: **speed and legitimacy** must not be mutually exclusive. A qualified

veto protects against overreaction – but does not prevent a necessary defence.

## Article 3: Recognition of borders

### 3.1 Recognition of internationally legitimised state borders

The signatory states recognise the internationally recognised borders. This means that those borders apply which have been confirmed by at least two thirds of the international community of states.

## Article 4: Common defence guarantee

### 4.1 Common defence and mutual assistance

#### 1. **Attack is considered an attack on all**

An armed attack on a GPP member state is considered an attack on the entire community.

This automatically triggers the collective defence mechanism as described in Article 2.

#### 2. **obligation to provide active support**

All GPP member states undertake to support the attacked state with appropriate means.

This includes in particular:

- Military assistance (e.g. operational forces, reconnaissance, air defence, logistics)
- Economic support (e.g. emergency financing, stabilisation of trade, supply of strategic goods)
- Technological and infrastructural assistance (e.g. cyber defence, communication systems, medical care)

#### 3. **Automatic mechanism - no individual assessment necessary**

The obligation to provide assistance arises without a separate Council decision.

The GPP Defence Council coordinates the implementation – based on the defence architecture defined in Article 5.

Immediate measures can be initiated by the management body – in accordance with the procedure in Article 6.

## Article 5: GPP defence strategy and security architecture

### 5.1 Principle of collective security and collective protection

The foundation of the GPP defence strategy is the reliable solidarity of all member states.

Protection does not come about through threatening behaviour – but through a clear, active willingness to stand by each other.

This includes in particular:

- Consistent measures against aggressors:  
All GPP states undertake to take collective economic and political measures in the event of behaviour by a state that violates international law – with a clear line and without national exceptions.
- Supply guarantee within the community:  
If sanctions lead to shortages, the other member states provide up to 10% of their available resources in the areas of energy, food, medicine and technology. This is coordinated by the GPP deployment structure. The burden is distributed fairly according to GDP.  
Supplies are provided at solidarity prices, i.e. without commercial mark-ups.
- Willingness to limit themselves:  
Countries that temporarily accept restrictions in order to help others demonstrate the strength of a genuine peace alliances.

## 5.2 Military assistance and response capability

- Defence guarantee without delay:  
In the event of an attack on a GPP member, it will automatically receive military support from all other members – without separate coordination, but in close coordination.
- Rapid response capability:  
A multinational response force – consisting of highly mobile special forces, drone units, satellite systems and defensive high technology – must be ready for action within 24 to 48 hours.
- Preventive protection instead of escalation:  
In foreseeable conflicts, troop movements, air surveillance or maritime presence can be deployed in endangered regions within the framework of international law in order to deter – not provoke – potential aggressors.

## 5.3 Structure and personnel of the GPP defence forces

- Professionalised defence core:  
Each GPP member permanently provides 0.1% of its population as highly qualified, operationally ready special forces.
- Civilian reserve force with security training:  
A further 0.5% of the population is trained as civilian and military reservists – with skills in rescue, communications, infrastructure, satellite control or humanitarian operations.
- Integration of expertise:  
In crisis situations, technical, medical or logistical experts from civil society can be integrated in a targeted manner – on a voluntary and protected basis.

---

## 5.4 Strategic command and operational responsibility

- Supreme command with mandate and backing:  
The operational leadership of the GPP lies with a multinationally legitimised commander-in-chief, supported by the GPP Defence Council.
- Qualifications count – not origin:  
The Commander-in-Chief must have demonstrable experience in modern peacekeeping and international operations.
- Responsible operational decisions:  
Deployments are decided by a majority of the Defence Council – always in consultation with the state concerned.  
Preventive measures require a clear threat situation and a feedback procedure with the member states.

## 5.5 Armaments policy and financing structure

- Transparent capacity analysis:  
The Defence Council regularly reviews the existing equipment and capabilities of the member states – to ensure a coordinated, effective and efficient strategy.
- Collective rearmament with democratic legitimacy:  
New investments in GPP defence capabilities must be decided by a qualified 2/3 majority.
- Responsible budget limits:  
In peacetime, defence spending amounts to a maximum of 2% of national GDP, divided into 1% for national tasks and 1% for GPP responsibilities.
- Alternative contribution solution for non-participation in active defence:  
States that are unable to deploy their own forces instead make a mandatory annual payment of 2% of their GDP, divided into 1.2% national and 0.8% GPP-related.

# Article 6: Structure and decision-making mechanism of the GPP leadership

## 6.1 Three-member military leadership

The strategic leadership of GPP defence lies with a three-member international leadership team.

This body is made up of experts with operational experience who are elected by the GPP member states for a fixed term of office.

- One person takes the chair, coordinates the processes and represents the leadership externally.
- In the event of a deadlock, the chairperson has the casting vote.

This collective structure guarantees both the ability to act and balance.

## 6.2 Decision-making and veto rule

Decisions are generally made by majority vote within the leadership body.

In the case of security-relevant measures that affect the GPP as a whole (e.g. redeployment, border protection measures, mandate extensions),

the following qualified special rule applies:

A justified veto by a member of the governing body is permissible, but must be submitted in writing to the GPP Defence Council within 48 hours.

If the veto is not confirmed by the Council within a further 48 hours, the original resolution enters into force.

This regulation protects against blockades – without undermining security policy responsibility.

## 6.3 Cooperation with the member states

The GPP management body is in continuous contact with the defence representatives of the member states.

It coordinates the implementation of joint decisions and ensures professional operational management.

In acute situations, the committee can activate temporary task forces or task forces with clearly defined rights and duties, provided this has been agreed with the Defence Council.

# Article 7: Security of supply and compensation obligation

## 7.1 Solidarity-based compensation principle

The GPP member states undertake to cushion the economic and infrastructural consequential damage within the community in the event of jointly decided sanctions against third countries or aggressive GPP members.

No state may suffer existential bottlenecks through no fault of its own as a result of collective defence measures.

## 7.2 Compensation for internal sanctions

If a member state's aggressive behaviour leads to sanctioned trade disruptions (e.g. in the energy, food or technology sectors), the other GPP states are obliged to compensate other members for any supply shortfalls on a pro rata basis in accordance with a fair burden-sharing system.

The distribution is based on:

- Economic performance (GDP)
- Relevance of the affected good
- Transport capacity and availability

## 7.3 Conditions of compensation

Delivery is made at joint prices – i.e. without commercial profit mark-ups and on the basis of the average procurement costs of the supplying state.

Financing is provided jointly via the GPP security and supply fund.

## 7.4 Duration and extension

The compensation obligation exists for a maximum period of 24 months from the date of the sanction.

If it is not possible for the member concerned to find alternative sources of supply by this time, the compensation period can be extended by a qualified majority in the GPP Defence Council.

# Article 8: Digital peacekeeping and media ethics

## 8.1 Objective

An independent, internationally legitimised body for digital peace monitoring will be established to prevent digital aggression, targeted radicalisation and propagandistic hate messages within and between GPP member states.

## 8.2 Function and mandate

This body (for the time being: 'GPP Authority for Digital Integrity') is responsible for:

- analysing digital communication at an international, governmental or public-relevant level,
- providing early warning of digital escalation risks,

- drawing up binding guidelines for information ethics within the framework of the GPP core values.

### **8.3 Legal framework and procedures**

The authority operates on the basis of a common code, which is adopted by a qualified majority vote of the GPP Council.

All member states are obliged to inform national platform operators and media players about this code and to promote voluntary implementation.

### **8.4 Transparency and protection rights**

The authority does not carry out censorship.

It reports offences, recommends countermeasures and works with civil society bodies to review recommendations.

The aim is not control – but responsibility and resilience in the face of digital destabilisation.

### **8.5 Measures to promote responsibility**

The GPP digital authority can recommend and coordinate the following measures to promote responsibility, transparency and de-escalation in the digital space:

- The introduction of verified identities (e.g. clear name requirement or authenticity check) for users who are active in public debates, political commentaries or high-reach forums.
- The possibility of introducing mandatory temporary communication breaks (so-called ‘timeouts’) in the event of proven escalation posts – automated, fairly checked and limited in time.

These measures may only serve the interests of peace and public order and must be implemented in a comprehensible and proportionate manner in accordance with the rule of law. The privacy of uninvolved users must be protected at all times.

## **Article 9: Special Development Zones (SEZs) and their economic importance**

### **9.1 Objective and peace function**

The Global Peace Partnership (GPP) not only strives for security in the traditional sense, but also for peace through participation, prospects and economic stabilisation.

Special Development Zones (SEZs) serve this purpose as specifically established economic

areas in economically disadvantaged regions of GPP member states.

These zones create space for:

- productive investments,
- fair jobs,
- return opportunities for refugees,
- and regional development that reduces social tensions.

In particular, member states in which the average monthly income of the lower half of the population is below USD 400 voluntarily make suitable areas available.

The establishment of the SEZ can take place no earlier than 12 months after joining the agreement; commencement of operations will depend on the infrastructural conditions.

## **9.2 Special autonomous status**

Each SEZ is given the status of an autonomous economic and development zone under a GPP mandate.

It operates independently, with its own administration, its own economic framework and its own social order – but is bound by the basic values of the GPP.

It is managed by a non-profit-making body with democratic participation, which is appointed, monitored and regularly evaluated by the GPP.

The special development zones (SEZ) designated in this agreement correspond to the sovereign status “Union Freedom” (UF). This special status constitutes an autonomous, peace-oriented territory under the supervision of the GPP, the precise framework of which is defined in the side letter.

## **9.3 Return and duration**

After a clearly defined development phase of 40 years, the entire SEZ area is transferred unconditionally and without additional fees to the full sovereignty of the state of origin.

This transfer includes ownership, infrastructure and all rights – while maintaining the social commitments made.

## **9.4 Financing and transfer structure**

The SEZs follow an innovative financial model:

- No traditional taxes or levies are charged.

- Instead, a standardised transaction fee of max. 18% applies to all digital payments and documented exchange transactions.

This transfer fee replaces:

- Income tax, corporate tax and value added tax
- as well as all levies for healthcare, education, infrastructure and social benefits.

All transactions are made via a centralised, fee-free payment system. Cash is excluded to ensure transparency, efficiency and prevention of abuse.

## 9.5 Investment incentives

Investors benefit from:

- Complete tax exemption (no corporate, income or profit taxation),
- stable legal certainty,
- fair digital infrastructure,
- opportunities to repatriate capital (under transfer regulations),
- sector-specific support for development, securing skilled labour and social standards.

At the same time, investors undertake to comply with the GPP basic values, to pay fair wages and to participate in local development programmes.

## 9.6 Impact on the population and prospects for return

The aim of the SEZs is to actively reduce local poverty and create decent prospects. The regions are given access to

- Qualified jobs with an income target of at least USD 800 per month,
- basic social services (education, medicine, childcare, pensions),
- new opportunities for returnees and refugees under the rule of law and humane conditions.

## 9.7 Rental structure

- In the first five years, the SEZ space remains rent-free to facilitate investment.
- Thereafter, there will be a gradual rent adjustment (USD 5,000 to USD 50,000 per km<sup>2</sup> per month), staggered according to location value, utilisation and turnover.
- The rent structure can be customised for specific sectors and is regulated in detail in a supplementary set of rules under GPP supervision.

## 9.8 Uniformity and monitoring

All SEZs worldwide under GPP mandate work according to a standardised set of rules that guarantees legal certainty, minimum ethical standards and social fairness. Monitoring is carried out by a neutral GPP control structure with the participation of local partners, civil society organisations and international development actors.

**Access to investments in SEZs is open only to companies that sign a binding self-commitment to comply with the GPP principles on aggression.**

This ethical core obligation is a prerequisite for any economic activity within the SEZs. A broader GPP partnership (e.g., with a peace seal and contribution pursuant to Article 16) is voluntary and may be publicly communicated without being linked to economic advantages.

The detailed provisions regarding administration, financing, infrastructure, security, social standards, and investment conditions within the SEZs are set out in the binding side letter to the GPP and are considered an integral part of this agreement.

# Article 9a: Obligation to Provide SEZs in Poverty-Stricken Countries

## 9a.1 Obligation to Provide Land

Member States with a per capita income below USD 400 undertake to establish at least one Special Economic Zone (SEZ) within 12 months of acceding to the agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the side letter.

## 9a.2 Objective

The SEZ is intended to specifically promote the creation of jobs, infrastructure, social services, and economic stability in order to safeguard peace in the respective country.

## 9a.3 Non-Compliance and Consequences

If the state concerned fails to meet this obligation within a further six months after receiving a written reminder from the GPP Board, two courses of action are possible:

### a) **Withdrawal by the GPP:**

The GPP may refrain from establishing the SEZ in that state and terminate its membership status. In this case, GPP membership shall automatically expire.

**b) New Approach upon Consent:**

Alternatively, the state may request a new deadline or an alternative location. This requires confirmation by the GPP Board. If approved, the 12-month period shall begin anew.

**9a.4 Priority of the SEZ Objective**

The legal requirements for the planning, operation, and autonomous status of the SEZ shall be deemed accepted upon accession to the GPP. The state undertakes to harmonize its national regulations with the SEZ framework conditions within six months.

## Article 10: Promotion of Peaceful Trade and Fair Compensation

**10.1 Voluntary Accession to Customs Exemption**

GPP Member States have the option to join the GPP Customs Exemption Agreement. Accession obliges them to abolish customs duties on goods from other GPP customs-exempt states within 12 months of the agreement's entry into force. Provisions under point 3 are exempt from this obligation.

**10.2 Reciprocity and Transparency**

Customs exemption is granted exclusively between states that mutually commit to duty-free trade. Unilateral abolition of customs duties is not mandatory. All agreements shall be publicly documented.

**10.3 Temporary Tariffs in Case of Trade Imbalance**

A GPP State with a documented trade balance deficit of more than 3% in relation to a specific GPP partner state may, for a maximum of five years, take the following measures:

- For a deficit of 3–6%:  
up to 10% import duty on non-essential goods from that partner state.
- For a deficit exceeding 6%:  
up to 15% import duty permitted.

These measures shall apply only if:

- they are limited to non-essential goods (see point 4),
- the trade deficit is clearly documented (official statistics or bilateral confirmation),

- and they are automatically suspended if the trade deficit falls below 3% for two consecutive years.

#### **10.4 Non-Essential Goods**

Non-essential goods include products such as luxury items, non-essential consumer goods, designer products, jewelry, high-priced entertainment electronics, vehicles above the basic model, fashion accessories, etc.

Food, medicines, medical equipment, energy supply, drinking water technology, and educational infrastructure are generally considered essential.

#### **10.5 Obligation to Dismantle Tariffs**

All states with an existing customs regime undertake to fully abolish all customs duties on goods from GPP states with which they have no trade balance deficit within 12 months of accession.

#### **10.6 Compliance with International Obligations**

If a state is already a member of an existing customs union (e.g., the EU), its obligations toward third countries shall take precedence. The GPP accepts this; however, the state concerned must make full use of all feasible bilateral measures to promote customs exemption within the GPP.

#### **10.7 Limitation of Tariff Measures to Asymmetric Trade Relations**

A state may not impose tariffs if the relevant GPP partner country itself does not have a trade surplus in relation to it.

The imposition of temporary tariffs is permitted only if there is an asymmetric trade balance to the detriment of the state's own country.

Automatic mechanism: Tariff imposition will not be approved or extended if a mutually balanced trade relationship or a mutual deficit exists.

#### **10.8 Special Regulation for States with Membership in Other Customs Unions**

States that are already members of a customs union (e.g., the EU) and whose entire customs regime is bound to superior law shall be considered as having limited customs autonomy.

They may nonetheless join the GPP customs exemption provided that:

- they have bilateral leeway for tariff reductions and actively make use of it, and
- they commit to actively promoting the GPP customs objectives within their union.

In the event of a conflict with existing customs agreements, an official notification to the GPP is required. This will be recorded in the agreement to ensure transparency and legal certainty for other Member States.

## 10.9 Objective of Harmonization

The GPP aims, in the medium term, to establish a unified, duty-free internal market among all member states – regardless of previous economic alliances.

Transitional and protective measures (e.g., temporary tariffs) must be:

- clearly limited in duration,
- economically justified, and
- designed according to the principle of wealth equalization.

## Article 11: Voting rights within the GPP

### 11.1 Principle of participation

Each GPP member state is entitled to vote.

Fundamental decisions, including

- the election of the governing body,
- the appointment of the management of special development zones (SEZs),
- as well as contractually relevant adjustments,

are decided collectively in the plenary session of the member states.

### 11.2 Weighting of votes

In order to ensure fair representation of both large and small states, the following graduated distribution of votes applies:

<b>Inhabitants</b>	<b>Votes</b>
up to 10 million inhabitants	1 vote
up to 50 million inhabitants	2 votes
up to 100 million inhabitants	3 votes
up to 250 million inhabitants	4 votes
up to 500 million inhabitants	5 votes
up to 750 million inhabitants	6 votes
up to 1 billion inhabitants	7 votes
from 1 billion inhabitants	8 votes

**Note:** No state can have more than 8 out of 100 total votes – even if it has more than 1.5 billion inhabitants.

### 11.3 Protection of Small States

Decisions on fundamental treaty matters (such as enlargement, security architecture, or SEZ governance) shall require not only a majority of votes, but also the consent of at least 30% of the states represented – irrespective of their voting weight.

This provision ensures that larger states cannot override the collective will of the smaller countries.

### 11.4 Updating of Voting Rights

Voting rights shall be reviewed every five years, based on reliable population data from internationally recognized sources (such as the UN database).

Adjustments to voting rights shall enter into force automatically upon confirmation by the GPP Defence Council.

## Article 12: Climate neutrality as a responsibility for peace and a voting power bonus

### 12.1 Principle: Planetary Protection as a Peace Imperative

The Global Peace Partnership (GPP) recognizes global environmental degradation as one of the most serious threats to future peace, social stability, and international security.

All Member States commit to achieving national climate neutrality by no later than 2035. Those who act sooner not only help protect the planet – they also strengthen their role within the international community.

### 12.2 Time Bonus for Early Target Achievement

The GPP links progress in climate protection to a voting rights bonus within the organization.

#### a) Calculation Methodology

- The target period for achieving climate neutrality ends in the year 2035.
- States that reach the target earlier shall receive additional votes, proportional to the number of years remaining until 2035.

The formula is as follows:

For each full year that a state achieves climate neutrality before 2035, it shall receive a voting bonus equal to 100% per year of its regular number of votes.  
Maximum bonus: 700% (for achieving the target in 2028 – i.e. 7 years early).

### b) Examples

Year of Achievement	Time Gained (Years)	Voting Bonus
2032	3 years early	+300% of base votes
2028	7 years early	+700% of base votes

A state with 5 regular votes that achieves climate neutrality in 2028 shall receive:  
5 (base votes) + 35 (700% bonus) = 40 total votes.

## 12.3 Climate-Positive Bonus

States that are not only climate neutral but operate with net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, for example, through reforestation, carbon capture, or technology transfer to other countries, shall receive an additional bonus of 50% to 100% on their total number of votes, as determined by a scientific review panel of the GPP.

## 12.4 Verification and Transparency

Achievement of the targets must be validated by an independent international monitoring body.

The voting rights bonus shall only be activated upon positive verification.

Member States commit to the full disclosure of relevant data (including energy, transport, industry, and agriculture) and to regular progress reporting.

## 12.5 Democratic Steering Effect

This provision establishes a strong and peaceful incentive:

Those who act early and comprehensively to protect our planet assume leadership – not by virtue of size, but by the power of example.

The bonus is not permanent; after 2040, it shall be integrated into a new evaluation model that incorporates additional sustainability dimensions, including water, soil, and biodiversity.

# Article 13: Accession of vulnerable States and graduated security integration

### 13.1 Principle

States whose territory is wholly or partially threatened, shelled, or occupied by foreign armed forces may, in principle, become members of the GPP – provided they actively commit to the principles of peaceful conduct, territorial integrity, and multilateral cooperation.

Security integration shall take place in stages, based on actual territorial control and the specific nature of the threat.

### 13.2 Security Zone Model

When a vulnerable state joins the GPP, two categories of its national territory are distinguished:

- Zone A: Fully integrated areas under complete governmental control – even if subject to military threats.
  - Full mutual assistance obligations under Articles 4 and 5 shall apply.
- Zone B: Areas under limited control or subject to repeated attacks and occupation.
  - Graduated protective measures under Article 13a shall apply.
  - Military operations by GPP Member States in these areas are categorically excluded.

### 13.3 Accession Protocol

The accession of a state with Zone B territories shall take place on the basis of an individual protocol, adopted by a qualified majority of GPP Member States. The protocol shall define:

- the classification of areas into Zones A and B,
- the applicable protection mechanisms, and
- the criteria for the future integration of Zone B into Zone A.

### 13.4 Protection Framework for Zone B - Clear Delimitation

In Zone B, the GPP categorically excludes all forms of military involvement. Only non-military measures are permitted, including:

- technical risk mitigation,
- economic and diplomatic protective measures,
- humanitarian assistance.

This separation is legally binding and non-negotiable. It ensures credibility and safeguards the peaceful identity of the GPP.

### 13.5 No Recognition of Territorial Losses

The accession of a partially destabilized state shall not be construed as recognition of violence or territorial claims.

The GPP remains committed to the principles of international law and the inviolability of international borders.

### 13.6 Legal Certainty for Support Measures

GPP Member States categorically exclude participation in armed conflict.

However, non-military support measures – such as economic, technical, or diplomatic assistance – are legitimate under the right of self-defense as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

## Article 13a: Differentiated assistance in zone B

### 13a.1 Principle

States in Zone B may be victims of targeted aggression despite lacking full control over their territory – for example through:

- missile or drone attacks,
- cyberattacks,
- economic coercion or destabilization.

The GPP shall provide mandatory support, strictly non-military in nature – complemented by the affected state's right to active self-defense.

### 13a.2 Protective Measures in Zone B

#### a) Technological Protection

GPP Member States shall provide:

- early warning systems, satellite surveillance, and cyber defense,
- protection of critical infrastructure,
- humanitarian aid and evacuation support.

#### b) Support through Defensive Technologies (Non-State, Non-Troop-Linked)

The GPP permits the supply of purely defensive technologies by private-sector companies from member states, provided this serves the self-defense of the affected state. This includes, in particular:

- systems for the defense against drone, missile, or air attacks,
- cyber defense and digital early warning systems,
- electronic reconnaissance for risk prevention.

**The GPP itself does not supply weapons or military equipment and does not deploy state-organized armaments or troops to Zone B.**

All support measures remain technical and civilian in nature. The measure is carried out exclusively at the request of the attacked state and is subject to international law (in particular, Art. 51 of the UN Charter).

**c) Economic and Diplomatic Responses**

GPP Members commit to:

- a complete halt of military, strategic, and economic cooperation with aggressor states,
- coordinated sanctions,
- joint public condemnation and diplomatic isolation of aggressors.

### 13a.3 Activation

These protective measures shall be activated upon request by the affected state through a simple majority decision of the GPP Defence Council.

A veto by individual states is excluded.

### 13a.4 No Automatic Escalation

The measures outlined in this Article do not constitute a case of collective defense. Zone B remains militarily separated from the GPP; support is provided through civilian, technological, and economic means.

**Defensive capability: Yes. Entry into war: No.**

## Article 13b: Arms deliveries and sanctions for aiding and abetting aggression

### 13b.1 Prohibition of Arms Transfers to Aggressor States

GPP Member States are strictly prohibited from supplying weapons, ammunition, military equipment, or war-relevant technologies:

- directly or indirectly,
- through state, private, or affiliated actors,

- or via third-party intermediaries,

to any state or organization defined as an aggressor under Articles 1 and 14.

Any such violation shall be treated within the GPP as an active act of aggression, and shall be subject to the same sanctions as a military attack (cf. Articles 5 and 14).

### **13b.2 Prohibition of Transit of Arms for Aggressors**

No GPP Member State shall permit the transit of arms shipments destined for aggressors or their intermediaries through:

- its national territory,
- its airspace, or
- its territorial waters.

Such transit shall be deemed complicity in aggression and shall be subject to corresponding sanctions.

### **13b.3 Permitted Arms Transfers for Self-Defense**

The delivery of the following is permitted and consistent with international law:

- defensive weapons,
- protective systems and reconnaissance technologies, and
- non-offensive military means,

to GPP Member States or peace-oriented third states, provided they are demonstrably acting in self-defense.

Such deliveries are expressly authorized, including when made by states outside the GPP – provided that the recipient is not an aggressor state and no violation of international law is involved.

### **13b.4 Sanctions Against States That Arm Aggressors**

States outside the GPP that:

- supply weapons or military technologies to aggressors,
- actively serve as transit states for such deliveries, or
- support belligerent actors through arms logistics,

shall be subject to coordinated sanctions imposed by the GPP.

These sanctions include:

- a complete ban on trade and investment in all security-relevant sectors,
- full exclusion from access to GPP markets, technologies, and infrastructure,
- a general entry ban for all nationals of the sanctioned country (exceptions apply for humanitarian and medical emergencies),
- suspension of all cooperation in the fields of education, research, energy, digitalization, and health.

### 13b.5 Duration of Sanctions and Conditions for Reinstatement

- Sanctions shall remain in effect for a minimum of five years following the last verified instance of support for aggression.
- Early lifting of sanctions is only possible if the sanctioned state:
  - publicly and credibly distances itself from its prior support,
  - provides concrete reparations or other forms of restitution, and
  - agrees to undergo peace policy monitoring by the GPP.

### 13b.6 Transparency and Oversight

- All arms exports by or to GPP Member States must be registered with the GPP Arms Control Authority.
- An annual public report shall document:
  - all known international arms transfers,
  - violations of this Article, and
  - the resulting measures taken.

## Article 13c: Arms transfers and arms neutrality

### 13c.1 Prohibition of Arms Deliveries to Aggressor States

No GPP member state may supply or transfer weapons, military equipment, or security-relevant technologies to a state that is classified as an aggressor state or is conducting a war of aggression in violation of international law.

The transit of such goods through the territory of a GPP state – by land, water, or air – is likewise prohibited if they benefit an aggressor state.

**Permissible**, however, is the support of **non-aggressive states** engaged in legitimate self-defense (cf. Art. 13a para. 2b).

Such deliveries may **only be made via secure GPP member states or third countries**, and under no circumstances through the territory of an aggressor.

### 13c.2 Sanctions Against Third States Supplying Aggressors

States outside the GPP that supply aggressors with weapons, ammunition, or security-relevant technologies – either directly or via intermediaries – shall be deemed **active supporters of aggression**. They shall be subject to the following GPP-wide sanctions:

- **Exclusion from access to GPP markets**, including trade with GPP states, participation in public tenders, or technology transfer.
- **Blocking of access to energy sources**, infrastructure, and transport services under the control of GPP members.
- **Prohibition of participation in multilateral GPP programs**, partnerships, or research projects.
- **Entry ban** for all relevant political and economic decision-makers from these states into the territory of GPP member states.
- **Minimum duration of sanctions**: 5 years from the official end of the aggression – regardless of any possible change of government in the third country concerned.

**The sanctions apply without exceptions and must be enforced by all GPP member states without fail.**

### 13c.3 Permitted Arms Deliveries for Self-Defense

GPP member states may supply arms, technologies, or equipment to other GPP states or to third countries, provided that they:

- are not themselves aggressors as defined in Article 2,
- are not participating in a war of aggression in violation of international law, and
- the delivery serves exclusively the purpose of legitimate self-defense, within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Permitted in particular are deliveries in the field of passive or defensive capabilities, such as:

- drone or missile defense systems,
- cyber defense and communications protection,
- early warning systems and satellite reconnaissance,
- protective infrastructure for the civilian population.

Explicitly excluded are offensive weapons if they are capable of carrying out attacks beyond the state's own territory, except within the framework of legitimate self-defense against imminent threats (see Art. 13a para. 2b).

### 13c.4 Coordination Within Other Defense Alliances (e.g., NATO)

GPP Member States that are also members of other defense alliances (such as NATO, the African Union, or ASEAN) commit to prioritizing the graduated measures framework of the GPP in response to non-military acts of aggression (cf. Article 1) – particularly economic

sanctions.

If a partner alliance, such as NATO, plans a military counterstrike, the GPP Member State reserves the right not to participate in such action, unless a direct military aggression, as defined in Article 4, has occurred.

## **Article 14: Sanctions against aggressors and systematic threats to infrastructure**

### **14.1 Economic deterrence through coordinated sanctions**

The GPP relies on economic sanctions as its main instrument against aggressive states that:

- directly attack, destabilize, or threaten a GPP member through hybrid means,
- refuse to recognize territorial integrity and international law,
- repeatedly violate international obligations and GPP principles.

Possible sanctions include:

- trade and technology embargoes,
- financial restrictions,
- exclusion from multilateral projects,
- blocking international waterways, ports, or transit routes, provided these are under GPP control.

Special rule: If an aggressor state deliberately interrupts the water or energy supply of a GPP member, the GPP's solidarity obligation is automatically activated (see Article 7) in order to compensate for supply shortages collectively and fairly.

### **14.2 Infrastructure Sabotage as a Hostile Act**

The deliberate destruction or sabotage of critical infrastructure by an aggressor state – including:

- pipelines,
  - power connections,
  - internet access points or cable networks,
- shall be regarded as a targeted attack on the GPP community.

Consequences:

→ The GPP shall impose immediate and severe economic and diplomatic countermeasures.

→ A military response is excluded, as alternative supply routes (e.g., satellite internet, emergency lines, partner networks) shall have been established in advance.

### 14.3 Prevention and Responsibility of Member States

All GPP Member States commit to:

- regularly conducting their own risk assessments of critical infrastructure,
- developing preventive contingency plans to ensure energy, data, and communication security,
- engaging in information exchange with other GPP States on security standards, redundancies, and emerging technologies.

The objective is a resilient, crisis-proof infrastructure cooperation—free from coercive dependencies.

### 14.4 A Clear Message to the International Community

The GPP sends an unequivocal message:

Those who weaponize infrastructure forfeit access to the achievements of peaceful cooperation.

**The protection of critical infrastructure is not merely a technical responsibility, but a fundamental pillar of the international peace order.**

## Article 14a: Responsibility of non-state actors and companies

Companies, organizations, or individuals who directly or indirectly support aggression against a GPP member—for example, through money, technology, or data—will be treated by the GPP as economic co-aggressors.

The measures are directed exclusively against these individuals or entities, not against states or entire economic sectors.

Peaceful, humanitarian, and scientific activities remain unaffected.

### 14a.1 Definition and scope of application

Natural persons, legal entities, or economic associations that contribute directly or indirectly to the execution of an act of aggression through the provision of supplies, financing,

logistical, digital, or technical support shall be considered economic co-aggressors within the meaning of this treaty.

### **14a.2 Primary responsibility**

Measures and sanctions are primarily directed against the person or entity directly involved, as well as against controlled subsidiaries and affiliated structures.

### **14a.3 Corporate and owner liability**

Parent companies and beneficial owners are liable if direct influence, control, or knowingly omitted control obligations can be proven.

### **14a.4 State co-responsibility (narrowly defined)**

States will only be implicated if they knowingly support or authorize the actions in question, or fail to take reasonable countermeasures after official GPP notification.

### **14a.5 Penalties**

All measures provided for in Article 14 may be imposed on economic co-aggressors, including:

- Exclusion from trade, payment transactions, and investment;
- Suspension of market and project participation in GPP states;
- Exclusion from special economic zones (SEZs) and international cooperation or support programs.

## **Article 14b: Immediate measures in the event of individual or hybrid aggression**

When individuals or companies enable aggression against a peace-loving country—whether through cyberattacks, money flows, technical assistance, or targeted manipulation—the GPP acts immediately.

They can be placed on an international blacklist. Then the following applies: no accounts, no trade, no access to GPP countries. Only when it has been proven that there has been no wrongdoing will the ban be lifted.

The principle is: stop first, then investigate – to protect peace before damage is done.

### **14b.1 Scope of application**

This article applies to natural persons and legal entities that, through technical, financial, or organizational actions, directly or indirectly enable or promote aggression against a GPP member.

### **14b.2 Trigger for immediate action**

As soon as at least two independent indicators are available—such as technical forensic data, confirmed CERT reports, payment or communication traces—the GPP Secretariat can immediately order emergency measures and add the affected person or entity to the official GPP blacklist.

### **14b.3 Automatic effects after blacklist entry**

1. Financial freeze: All banks, payment service providers, and crypto platforms operating in GPP countries must immediately freeze all known accounts, wallets, and payment channels belonging to the listed person or entity.
2. Digital freeze: Providers, hosters, registrars, CDN and cloud providers must deactivate domains, IPs, servers, APIs, and digital access.
3. Travel and market exclusion: Lifetime entry and residence ban in all GPP member states, as well as exclusion from special development zones, public contracts, and subsidy programs.
4. Cooperation ban: Companies that knowingly cooperate with listed actors may also be blocked.

### **14b.4 Implementation period**

Financial and infrastructure service providers operating in GPP countries shall implement these orders immediately, at the latest within four hours of receipt.

### **14b.5 Review and delisting**

Within fourteen days of registration, an independent review panel will conduct an expedited review. Confirmed cases will remain blocked or be extended; unfounded entries must be immediately removed and publicly corrected.

### **14b.6 Safe harbor for exporting institutions**

Banks, payment service providers, and providers acting in good faith and in accordance with GPP instructions are protected from civil liability, provided there is no gross negligence.

## 14b.7 Relationship with states

States are not automatically punished under this rule. State complicity only arises if the state concerned deliberately protects or supports aggressors, or fails to take reasonable countermeasures after being notified.

# Article 15: Seat and Structure of the GPP

## 15.1 Provisional Seat of the Organization

- The provisional headquarters of the GPP shall be located in the country where the organization was formally established and registered – at the time of this treaty: Austria.
- The final designation of the permanent headquarters shall be determined by majority decision of the GPP Member States within three years of the treaty's entry into force.

## 15.2 Site Selection Criteria

The permanent seat of the GPP shall:

- ensure international accessibility, neutrality, and security,
- offer appropriate infrastructure for diplomatic, technical, and civilian cooperation,
- serve as a symbolic representation of the organization's peace-oriented mission.

## 15.3 Vienna / UNO-City Option

The use of suitable infrastructure in Vienna – particularly parts of the UNO-City – shall be considered a viable transitional or permanent solution, provided that a mutually agreed arrangement with the Austrian authorities and the United Nations can be reached.

The Vienna location offers distinct advantages due to its humanitarian tradition, international presence, and geopolitical balance.

## 15.4 Decentralized Structure Permitted

The GPP may establish regional coordination centers, technical subunits (e.g., for cyber defense, peace research, or logistics), or special missions in other Member States – based on a proposal by the GPP General Assembly and with the consent of the host country.

---

## Article 16: Financing of the GPP and participation of the business community

### 16.1 National Responsibility for Delegations

Each GPP Member State shall bear the costs associated with its own appointed representatives. This includes, in particular:

- travel, accommodation, and security expenses,
- personal protection before, during, and after official meetings, where applicable,
- and the operational costs of national diplomatic coordination offices.

### 16.2 Basic Funding Through a Symbolic Per-Capita Contribution

To finance the GPP's collective responsibilities, Member States shall provide an annual contribution of:

1 USD per inhabitant, rounded to the nearest full million per country.

This contribution shall be used exclusively to fund the following non-military core functions:

1. Digital Infrastructure:  
Development and operation of secure communication platforms, conference systems, and data centers.
2. Administration and Coordination:  
Personnel for facilitation, minute-taking, translation, legal review, and ombudsperson services.
3. Peace Communication and Education:  
Awareness campaigns, peace curricula, and digital school and civic engagement programs.
4. Participation and Editorial System:  
Maintenance of the living treaty document and integration of proposals from Member States, expert panels, and civil society.

Important: These funds are strictly earmarked for peaceful, civil infrastructure and must not be used for military purposes.

### 16.3 Voluntary Participation of the Private Sector

Companies and corporations may voluntarily register as GPP Peace Partners, provided they meet the following requirements:

- An annual contribution of at least 0.5% of their global revenue to the GPP Peace Fund (either directly or project-specific),

- A written declaration of commitment to the GPP's rules on aggression (no cooperation with aggressor states, no export of critical goods to conflict zones).

These companies shall receive:

- the GPP Peace Seal for public designation,
- access to GPP public tenders,
- the opportunity to participate in an advisory business forum.

## 16.4 Supplementary Project-Based Contributions

In addition to the per-capita contribution, Member States or organizations may provide earmarked special contributions.

for example, to support education funds, infrastructure assistance, SEZs, or research institutions.

## 16.5 Transparency

All revenues and expenditures shall be published annually and reviewed by an independent oversight body.

Budgetary decisions shall be made by simple majority of the GPP Member States.

The audit reports specified in the side letter shall be submitted, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, to the GPP Financial Supervisory Authority and the GPP Transparency Council.

## 16.6 Management and Use of Unspent Funds

The financial administration of the GPP shall be handled by an independent, civilian-led GPP Finance Secretariat.

- Headed by a publicly appointed Peace Finance Director (also referred to as "Minister of Peace Finance").
- This individual shall be elected by the GPP General Assembly for a term of three years (renewable).
- The Director is responsible for budget management, allocation of funds, and the publication of transparent financial reports.
- All expenditures shall be subject to review by an independent oversight body.

**Unspent funds from any fiscal year shall not be refunded, but shall be automatically transferred to the GPP Solidarity and Crisis Fund.**

This fund is intended to:

- provide rapid assistance in humanitarian or economic emergencies within Member States,
- cover transport costs for essential supplies to crisis areas,
- ensure temporary delivery of energy, water, or medication during supply shortages,
- finance critical emergency measures to stabilize GPP Members in distress.

**Disbursements shall be authorized by the GPP Crisis Council, coordinated by the Finance Secretariat, and approved by simple majority.**

## Article 17: Solidarity with Starving and Extremely Poor States

### 17.1 Objective

The GPP recognizes that lasting peace is not possible without combating hunger, extreme poverty, and lack of basic services. The community therefore commits to providing targeted humanitarian assistance to particularly affected member countries – both in the short term during crises and in the long term through structural poverty reduction.

### 17.2 Criteria for Solidarity Aid

A member state is considered in need of humanitarian assistance if:

- more than 25% of the population lives below the international poverty line of USD 2.15 per day (as defined by the World Bank),
- more than 15% of the population regularly suffers from acute malnutrition, or
- basic medical care is not ensured for more than 30% of the population.

These criteria shall be reviewed annually by an independent GPP body.

### 17.3 Humanitarian Care Centers (HCCs)

In affected member countries, at least one – ideally several – HCCs (Humanitarian Care Centers) shall be established, in which:

- free or heavily subsidized food (preferably locally produced or donated) is made available,
- basic medical care and medicines are provided,
- children receive basic education and mothers have access to hygiene products and counseling.

Purchases are made using a digital credit card (HCC Card) that each eligible citizen receives monthly. This is financed from the GPP Relief Fund.

## 17.4 Financing of the Relief Fund

The fund is financed through:

- voluntary contributions from member states, recommended at USD 1 per capita per year, mandatory from a per capita GDP of USD 8,000;
- contributions from companies with a voluntary solidarity share of at least 0.2% of turnover.
- Companies engaging within this framework shall have the right, as a visible sign of their participation in peace efforts, to display the white peace dove carrying a silver globe in its beak.
- Companies contributing at least 0.5% of their turnover may display the white peace dove carrying a golden globe in its beak. This symbol may be displayed on packaging, products, websites, or official documents.
- targeted fundraising campaigns, bequests, and charitable cooperation projects.

## 17.5 Tax Deductibility

GPP member states undertake to amend their national tax laws so that all donations to the GPP Solidarity and Food Aid Fund are fully tax-deductible. This amendment must be implemented no later than 12 months after accession.

## 17.6 Spending Guideline: 80% Aid - 20% Logistics

The fund commits to a clear allocation key:

- At least 80% of the donated amount must be used for the purchase of food, drinking water, medicines, or relief supplies;
- A maximum of 20% may be used for logistics, transport, distribution, administration, and communication.

An independent oversight body shall produce an annual audit report on the use of funds, which will be publicly accessible.

## 17.7 Transparency and Oversight

- All expenditures shall be made transparent via a central digital platform with public access;
- The GPP Fund is subject to an annual audit by an independent auditing body;
- Violations of the guidelines shall result in the immediate freezing of disbursements and

the removal of responsible officials.

## 17.8 Combination with SEZs

In economically extremely weak countries where SEZs are planned or active, additional humanitarian HCC zones may be established within the SEZ - but exclusively for charitable purposes and separate from economic operations.

# Article 18: Final provisions

## 18.1 Legal Binding Force, Priority, and Administrative Structure

### 1. **Validity and Entry into Force**

This treaty shall enter into force once it has been signed by at least 20 states.

Each state concludes the treaty individually with the GPP, thereby making it legally binding.

### 2. **Treaty Commitment**

The signatory states commit to actively implementing, promoting, and further developing this treaty in its entirety—guided by the vision of a peaceful global order.

### 3. **Legal Binding Force**

The GPP Treaty constitutes a legally binding instrument under international law.

Any amendments or exemptions require the approval of at least two-thirds of the Member States.

### 4. **Priority in Relation to Other Alliances**

The goals of the GPP—peaceful conduct, coordinated sanctions, poverty reduction, and environmental responsibility—are to be implemented in harmony with existing alliances (e.g., NATO, EU, ASEAN).

In cases of conflict, GPP principles shall prevail only if they offer a more peaceful and de-escalatory path.

### 5. **Administration and Oversight**

A dedicated administrative structure—led by a Minister of Peace Finance and a Defense Coordinator—ensures transparency and effectiveness in the implementation of measures.

### 6. **Peace Promotion Through Investment**

Long-term stability and peace can only be achieved through targeted investment in poverty-affected states and SEZs (Special Engagement Zones).

GPP Members therefore actively support their expansion and advancement.

**This treaty is more than a political document - it is a shared promise to humanity that peace shall no longer be negotiated, but anchored: through solidarity, through law, and through shared responsibility.**

**The signatory states acknowledge that lasting peace is not achieved through**

**deterrence alone, but through justice, stability, and the active overcoming of poverty and inequality.**